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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
THOMAS C. HILL, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20060309-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from consecutive sentences imposed after he pled guilty to 
aggravated assault and violation of a protective order, both third degree felonies, in the 
Second Judicial District, Weber County, the Honorable Roger S. Dutson presiding. This 
Court has jurisdiction over the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e).1 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences, where 
the court considered all legally relevant factors and where defendant had an extensive and 
serious criminal history, had knowingly violated a protective order, and had stabbed his 
estranged wife in the neck? 
Standard of Review, A trial court's sentencing decision is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, f 8,40 P.3d 626. 
Unless otherwise stated, all citations to the code are to the West 2004 
publication. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following relevant statute is reproduced in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State filed an information charging defendant with five counts: aggravated 
burglary, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203; aggravated 
kidnapping, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302; aggravated 
assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103; violation of a 
protective order following a prior conviction, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-5-108 and 77-36-1.1; and possession or use of a dangerous weapon by a 
restricted person, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
503(2)(b). Rl-2. The State later amended the information, dismissing the aggravated 
burglary count and adding a count of attempted murder, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203. R22, 23-24. 
Defendant pled guilty to aggravated assault and to violation of a protective order 
following a prior conviction. R43-44, 45-50. In exchange, the State dismissed the 
remaining charges. See id. The court then referred defendant to Adult Probation and 
Parole (AP&P) for preparation of a presentence investigation report (PSI). R44; see also 
PSI. 
On March 13, 2006, the court entered judgment, sentencing defendant to two 
consecutive prison terms of zero to five years. R61-62. Defendant timely appealed. 
R67. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The crime 
The Second District court issued a protective order forbidding defendant from 
contacting April Sube, his estranged wife. See R4. Defendant nevertheless contacted 
Sube at her residence. See id. The two argued, and defendant threatened to kill her and 
then himself. See id. Defendant used a butter knife to strike Sube in the head, neck, and 
left bicep. See id. Two of the strikes lacerated the back of Sube's neck and her left 
bicep. See id. Defendant then took pills in an attempt to harm himself. See R4-5. After 
Sube sought assistance, defendant was found unconscious in her apartment. R5. 
The sentencing hearing 
At a hearing held February 27,2006, defendant moved that sentencing be 
continued. R58. Defendant had apparently received a copy of the PSI and disputed 
some of the incidents in his criminal history. See id.; see also R73:7 ("Mr. Hill again is 
refuting many of the items."). The court granted the continuance and directed AP&P to 
file a supplemental memorandum verifying defendant's prior record. R58. 
Court reconvened on March 13, 2006. R61; see also R73:6-10 (transcript of 
sentencing hearing, reproduced in Addendum B). Defendant again contested the 
accuracy of his criminal history, as set forth in the PSI, but the trial court found that 
AP&P had confirmed the contested criminal incidents through fingerprint comparison. 
This version of the facts is taken from the probable cause affidavit. R4-5. The 
PSI contains a more detailed account of the criminal episode. See PSI at 3-6. 
The record does not contain a transcript of this proceeding. 
3 
R73:8. Moreover, the court explained, the accuracy of the contested incidents was not 
"going to make too much difference" because the "three prior imprisonments and 
continued violations of serious laws" were its real concern and the basis for its sentencing 
decision. R73:9. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed consecutive sentences. 
First, statutory law permits the court to impose consecutive sentences, even when the 
offenses upon which the convictions rest are part of the same criminal episode. 
Second, while the trial court must consider the factors outlined by section 
76-3-401 before imposing consecutive sentences, the trial court need not make specific 
findings of fact regarding the factors. This Court may assume that the trial court did 
consider the factors where the trial court referenced the PSI, which, in turn, addressed all 
of the statutory factors. 
Third, the imposition of consecutive terms was not, under the circumstances of 
this case, inherently unfair or clearly excessive. Defendant had an extensive and serious 
criminal history and had been imprisoned at least three times, prior to the instant 
offenses, for serious crimes. He had engaged in repeated acts of domestic violence, 
knowingly violated a protective order, and stabbed his estranged wife in the neck. 
4 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION 
WHEN IT IMPOSED CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES: THE COURT 
CONSIDERED ALL LEGALLY RELEVANT FACTORS, 
INCLUDING DEFENDANT'S REHABILITATIVE NEEDS, AND ITS 
SENTENCING DECISION WAS NEITHER INHERENTLY UNFAIR 
NOR CLEARLY EXCESSIVE 
Defendant claims that "the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced [him] 
to consecutive prison terms on offenses that occurred in the same criminal episode." 
Appellant's Br. at 9 (uppercase lettering omitted). Defendant further asserts that "[t]he 
trial court abused its discretion in this case because it failed to consider all the legally 
relevant factors.55 Id. at 10. Specifically, defendant asserts that "the trial court totally 
failed to look at any possible rehabilitative needs of the Defendant" and was "absolutely 
silent regarding any possible analysis as to the Defendant's ability to function in society, 
his ability to obtain new or different training, or the rehabilitative needs the Defendant 
could use in an effort to rehabilitate him back into society." Id. at 13. Defendant also 
asserts that the court abused its discretion because "it imposed an excessive sentence." 
Id. at 10. 
Defendant cannot prevail on these claims. A trial court may impose consecutive 
sentences on offenses that occurred in the same criminal episode. Although the trial court 
must consider all relevant legal factors before imposing consecutive sentences, it need 
not consider them on the record. Moreover, under the circumstances of this case, the 
consecutive sentences were not excessive. 
5 
Relevant law. A trial court's sentencing decision is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12,11 8, 40 P.3d 626. "The trial court abuses its 
discretion when it fails to consider all legally relevant factors, or if the sentence imposed 
exceeds the limits prescribed by law." State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66,1f 66, 52 P.3d 1210 
(citations omitted). Defendants face a particularly heavy burden when challenging a trial 
court's sentence. An appeals court "will not overturn a sentence unless it exceeds 
statutory or constitutional limits, the judge failed to consider all the legally relevant 
factors[,] or the actions of the judge were so inherently unfair as to constitute abuse of 
discretion." State v. Sotolongo, 2003 UT App 214, H 3, 73 P.3d 991 (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). "Indeed,... sentencing reflects the personal judgment 
of the court, and consequently, a sentence imposed by the trial court should be overturned 
only when it is inherently unfair or clearly excessive." Helms, 2002 UT 12, f 14 (citing 
State v. Woodland, 945 P.2d 665, 671 (Utah 1997)). 
A, Even assuming that the two crimes for which defendant was convicted were 
part of a single criminal episode, defendant cannot prevail on his claim that 
the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed consecutive sentences. 
Defendant first claims that "the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced 
[him] to consecutive prison terms on offenses that occurred in the same criminal 
episode." Appellant's Br. at 9 (uppercase lettering omitted). 
Defendant's claim is inadequately briefed. Defendant states, without analysis, that 
the convictions were a part of a "single criminal episode," as defined by section 
76-1-401. Id. at 11, 14. However, he has not alleged that the trial court erred, let alone 
explained how it erred, when it ruled that the crimes were not a part of a single criminal 
6 
episode. £££1173:10. This Court should therefore decline to address his claim. See State 
v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, % 12, 69 P.3d 1278 (where defendant fails to cite relevant 
authority, court will not find it for him); State v. Garner, 2002 UT App 234, \ 12, 52 P.3d 
467 (when party fails to offer meaningful analysis, the court will not reach merits of 
claim); State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 549 (Utah App. 1998) ("Utah courts routinely 
decline to consider inadequately briefed arguments."). 
In any case, defendant could not prevail even if the crimes were part of the same 
criminal episode. Statutory law permits courts to impose consecutive sentences "for 
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(5). 
Defendant's suggestion that consecutive sentences are improper, merely because the 
convictions rest on two offenses arising out of the same criminal episode, is therefore 
contrary to statutory law. 
B. The trial court properly considered all legally relevant factors when it 
imposed consecutive terms. 
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion because it imposed 
consecutive sentences without considering all legally relevant factors. Appellant's Br. at 
9. Defendant asserts that the trial court failed to consider his "rehabilitative needs," his 
"ability to function in society," and his "ability to obtain new or different training." Id. at 
13. Defendant argues that "[t]he possibility of rehabilitation by the Defendant together 
with his disputed criminal history was apparently not considered by the trial court," 
because the court did not specifically discuss that factor during the sentencing hearing. 
7 
Id. at 1L Defendant cannot prevail on this claim because the trial court did, in fact, 
consider the legally relevant factors. 
Statutory law outlines the factors a court must consider when determining whether 
to run sentences concurrently or consecutively: "[I]n determining whether state offenses 
are to run concurrently or consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and 
circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and 
rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2). These factors are 
reiterated in State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998), cited in defendant's brief. 
A sentencing court, however, is not required to state on the record its 
consideration of every legally relevant factor. Helms, 2002 UT 12,11 11. Instead, a 
reviewing court may assume that the sentencing court considered the factors, unless 
(1) an ambiguity of facts makes the assumption unreasonable, (2) a statute explicitly 
requires written findings, or (3) a prior case states that findings on the issue must be 
made. Id at 1111. None of these exceptions applies in this case. 
In Helms, 2002 UT 12, 40 P.3d 626, a case similar to the instant one, the 
defendant argued that the court should "assume that the trial court did not consider the 
factors at all, simply because it did not address each of the factors on the record." Id. at 
Tf 10. The supreme court rejected that argument, explaining that the court "will not 
assume that the trial court's silence, by itself, presupposes that the court did not consider 
the proper factors as required by law. To do so would trample on the deference this court 
usually gives to the sentencing decisions of a trial court." Id. at If 11 (citing State v. 
Woodland, 945 P.2d 665, 671 (Utah 1997)). The court held that "[n]either our case law 
8 
nor our statutes require a trial court to make specific findings of fact in a sentencing 
order." Id. atf 12. 
Instead, the court examined the record for "evidence to suggest that the trial court 
did consider all of the factors." Id. at f^ 13. The Helms court noted that the pre-sentence 
investigation report "contained] detailed information regarding not only the 'gravity and 
circumstances of the offenses,' but also the 'history, character, and rehabilitative needs of 
the defendant.'" Id. (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2)). Thus, the trial court's 
review of the PSI "evidence[d] that the trial court did consider Helms' history, character, 
and rehabilitative needs." Id. 
Defendant cannot distinguish Helms. In this case, as in Helms, AP&P prepared a 
PSI, which addressed each of the statutory factors. The PSI described in detail the 
gravity and circumstances of the criminal incident, including conduct that was not 
specifically mentioned on the record. See PSI at 3-6. It discussed defendant's extensive 
criminal history, including numerous violent crimes and his incarceration at both county 
and state facilities. Id. at 7-10. It also examined defendant's life history, current living 
situation, education, employment, and financial information. Id. at 11-12. It analyzed his 
substance abuse history and noted that defendant did not feel he needed drug abuse 
treatment. Id. at 12. 
The PSI also addressed defendant's rehabilitative needs, recognizing that he fell 
within the high risk needs classification, with problem areas in his criminal history, drug 
and alcohol use, and personal life. PSI, at 2. It also noted that this was not defendant's 
first arrest on domestic violence charges. Id. Based upon these facts, the report 
9 
suggested consecutive sentences. Id. Essentially, defendant had shown that he was not 
amenable to rehabilitation. After reviewing the PSI, the court ordered that defendant's 
sentences run consecutively, noting that defendant had "not shown that [he had] changed 
sufficiently to justify [a lesser sentence]." R73:9-10. 
Defendant has not pointed to anything in the record that demonstrates that the trial 
court failed to consider these factors. Moreover, while the trial court did not specifically 
refer to all of the factors in its ruling, the court referenced and relied on the PSI, which 
did address all legally relevant factors. See R73:6-10; PSL Under these circumstances, it 
is '"reasonable to assume that the court actually made such findings/" and this Court 
should "'uphold[] the trial court.'"4 Helms, 2002 UT 12, % 11 (quoting State v. 
Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1234 (Utah 1997)). Thus, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion by failing to consider the legally relevant factors when it imposed consecutive 
sentences.5 
In addition, the transcript of the sentencing hearing evidences the trial court's 
extensive consideration of defendant's criminal history. See R73:6-10. 
5
 Defendant argues that "[s]everal of [the relevant] factors can be applied 
favorably to the Defendant's situation." Br. Aplt. at 12. Although defendant is entitled 
to disagree with the sentencing court's decision, it does not constitute grounds for 
reversal. "[T]he fact that [defendant] views his situation differently than did the trial 
court does not prove that the trial court neglected to consider the [statutory] factors." 
Helms, 2002 UT 12, ^ [ 14. "Indeed, we have recognized that sentencing reflects the 
personal judgment of the court, and consequently, a sentence imposed by the trial court 
should be overturned only when it is inherently unfair or clearly excessive." Id. (citing 
Woodland, 945 P.2dat 671). 
10 
C. The sentencing decision was neither "inherently unfair" nor "clearly 
excessive." 
Defendant also contends that the imposition of consecutive sentences was "clearly 
excessive." However, the trial court is permitted, in its discretion, to impose consecutive 
sentences after considering the factors enumerated section 76-3-401(2). See Galli, 967 
P.2d at 938. The sentences imposed were within statutorily permitted limits, as defendant 
was sentenced to two consecutive terms of zero to five years in prison based upon two 
third degree felony convictions. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(1). Moreover, because 
of the serious nature of the crime and defendant's history, character, and lack of 
rehabilitation, the sentencing decision was neither "inherently unfair" nor "clearly 
excessive." See Sotolongo, 2003 UT App 214, f 3; see also State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT 
App 9, \ 12, 84 P.3d 854 (quoting State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978)) ("A 
court abuses its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences only if 'no reasonable 
[person] would take the view by the [sentencing] court'"). 
11 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's sentences should be affirmed. 
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76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences — Limitations — Definition. 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one felony offense, 
whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses. The court shall state on the record 
and shall indicate in the order of judgment and commitment: 
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to each other; and 
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively with any other sentences the 
defendant is already serving. 
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or consecutively, the court shall 
consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, 
and rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if the later offense is 
committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, unless the court finds and states on the record 
hat consecutive sentencing would be inappropriate. 
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences are to run consecutively 
>r concurrently, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall request clarification from the court. Upon receipt of 
tie request, the court shall enter a clarified order of commitment stating whether the sentences are to run 
onsecutively or concurrently. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a single criminal episode as 
efined in Section 76-1-401. 
(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all sentences imposed may 
Dt exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as provided under Subsection (6)(b). 
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if: 
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death penalty or a maximum sentence 
"life imprisonment; or 
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct which occurs after his initial 
ntence or sentences are imposed. 
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which were committed prior to 
position of the defendant's initial sentence; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present sentencing court or by a 
urt of another state or federal jurisdiction, and the conduct giving rise to the present offense did not occur 
er his initial sentencing by any other court. 
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of consecutive sentences and 
1
 manner in which they shall be served, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as 
•ugh he has been committed for a single term that consists of the aggregate of the validly imposed prison 
us as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the maximum sentence is considered 
)e 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if any, constitutes the aggregate 
he validly imposed minimum terms. 
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with the other or with a 
tence presently being served, the term that provides the longer remaining imprisonment constitutes the 
s to be served. 
10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of individual 
secutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of any sentence so imposed, but only to 
t the length of sentences actually served under the commitments. 
11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to impose consecutive sentences 
isdemeanor cases. 
12) As used in this section, "imprisonedM means sentenced and committed to a secure correctional 
ity as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not been terminated or voided, and the person is not 
ti coae decuun /U-^~TV/X 
mrole, regardless of where the person is located. 
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Addendum B 
OGDEN, UTAH - MARCH 13, 2006 
HONORABLE ROGER S. DUTSON PRESIDING 
For the Plaintiff: MARK A. DECARIA 
For the Defendant: JIM RETALLICK 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
MR. RETALLICK: No. 4 on the calendar, Thomas Hill, 
Your Honor 
COURT CLERK: State of Utah versus Thomas C. Hill, 
case #051903912. Time set for sentencing. 
THE COURT: - probation officer that I agree with the 
concept of what he was trying to get across with the 
recommendation for jail but -
MR. RETALLICK: This is Mr. Hill, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: (inaudible) keeps doing that. 
MS. ?: Yes, Your Honor. 
MR. RETALLICK: As the Court may recall this matter 
was continued for AP&P to try to verify some of the criminal 
history of defendant. 
THE COURT: We need to see what these California 
charges really were all about. 
MR. RETALLICK: Your Honor, according to an 
investigation done my Mr. LePlant, he said prior to preparing 
pre-sentence report ^1 reviewed the defendant's arrest history 
extensively, comparing his birth date and social security 
number to the BCI and Triple I information. I also reviewed 
1 limited computer records for AP&P regarding his commitment to 
2 the Utah State Prison in x78 and A81. Made contact with Alisha 
3 Wilson, tech for BCI who informed me that prior to an arrest 
4 being placed on defendant's arrest record they had compared the 
5 arrested person's fingerprints with the ones they currently 
6 have on file. They also used fingerprints to identify alias of 
7 individuals." 
8 And so basically they're saying that the criminal 
9 history that they have here is correct. Mr. Hill again is 
10 refuting many of the items. He does admit that he was in 
11 prison once before and that he had successfully terminated 
12 prison in 1981; that - and quite frankly, Your Honor, I have a 
13 real difficult time believing this Alisha Wilson tech with BCI 
14 saying every time they place on somebody's records they compare 
15 the fingerprints. I can't tell you how many times I've been 
16 here with people who have not been - their criminal history has 
17 shown - or indicated crimes that they were in fact not guilty 
18 of and so I, you know, I just - I find it absolutely amazing 
19 that they're going to compare fingerprints every 
20 time they attribute something as long as the social security 
21 and birth date match up, that's all they usually go on. 
22 Mr. Hill maintains that he was the victim of an 
23 identify theft. An old roommate of his took his name, date of 
24 birth and social security number and has been using it for a 
25 number of years. But Mr. Hill does admit that he was in prison 
1 in 1981. He admits that he had some minor offenses, the 
2 disorderly conduct. In 1987 it says fugitive from justice. 
3 There was a warrant served and he was returned to California. 
4 Wasn't it, in fact, you still maintain that was not 
5 you, is that correct? 
6 THE DEFENDANT: That wasn't me. 
7 MR. RETALLICK: He has never been extradited to 
8 California in any case, Your Honor. 
9 He admits the domestic violence in 2001. I think he 
10 admits the simple assault, class B, in 2003. So I don't know 
11 where we go from here, Your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: Well, I'll make note of those differences 
13 and frankly I show two commitments in California, one in x74 in 
14 Kachino and one in Susanville. Do you admit those? 
15 THE DEFENDANT: I did (inaudible). 
16 THE COURT: And then you were sent to prison in Utah 
17 in A79. 
18 THE DEFENDANT: (inaudible). 
19 THE COURT: There's a possibility that you are correct 
20 on the identity theft. However having referred it back to 
21 Adult Probation department, it does look like they have now 
22 gone back to compare fingerprints at least. Perhaps they don't 
23 always but I do believe that this re-referral that that has 
24 been confirmed. 
25 MR. RETALLICK: It doesn't state that there was any 
1 comparison of fingerprints, Your Honor. What it states is that 
2 DCI says before they do this, this is the general rule. It 
3 doesn't state that they specifically did it for this defendant. 
4 THE COURT: Yeah. Well, they're confirming what I had 
5 requested. I understand your argument. 
6 Anything more, Mr. Hill? 
7 THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
8 THE COURT: Does the State have anything further? 
9 MR. DECARIA: Now I'm concerned about what the 
10 defendant is contending with regard to this past criminal 
11 record. 
12 THE COURT: Frankly I don't think it's going to make 
13 too much difference to the Court because, except for the prison 
14 terms, that's what really causes me the concern of three prior 
15 imprisonments and continued violations of serious laws. That's 
16 what I'm basing my sentence on. 
17 MR. DECARIA: Okay, I'll submit it. 
18 THE COURT: Other than the ones that are clearly 
19 admitted here but they're misdemeanors. 
20 It is the sentence of this Court that you serve a 
21 zero to five year term at the Utah State Prison on the 
22 aggravated assault and that you serve a zero to five year term 
23 on the violation of the protective order and because of your 
24 serious history, I'm ordering that they run consecutive to each 
25 other. You've not shown that you've changed sufficiently to 
justify otherwise. I'll give you credit for time served on 
these charges since you were booked but these are to run 
consecutive to each other. 
MR. RETALLICK: Your Honor, weren't these one 
continuous criminal episode? 
THE COURT: Not really because the facts that gave 
rise to each were clearly different. 
MR. RETALLICK: I understand-
THE COURT: And they are different in the sense that 
when you've got a stabbing and you also have a protective order 
violation, his being there violates the protective order and 
then the consequent stabbing is a separate offense and I think 
both of them, with his history, are sufficient to justify 
consecutive sentences. That's (inaudible). 
Oh, Mr. Hill, you have 30 days in which to appeal the 
sentencing. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
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